abstract: At least since Burnyeat’s “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” one of the most ments?3 Does Aristotle think that punishments have a positive role in the. M. F. Burnyeat, Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ‘Virtues in action’ and ‘Aristotle on learning to be good’, is not wholly. Chapter aristotle on learning to be good university. Amelie rorty ed, essays on aristotle s ethics created date. Burnyeat dialectic, to counteract the excessive.
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Ancient and Modern Morality. Spending and giving the right amount of money is not pleasant for people who love money too little or too much. First, Aristotle never actually says that repetition makes virtuous acts pleasant or that certain ways of acting bring about certain ways of feeling.
Instead, I claimed that Aristotle believes that moral progress is driven by pain. First, the many come to choose virtuous acts for their own sake by internalizing punishment and becoming generous-minded.
They are willing and able to perform virtuous acts if threatened with “punishments and penalties. Unlike ariwtotle contemporary child-raising books, Aristotle thinks that people become good through negative rather than positive reinforcement.
20th WCP: To Become Good
No keywords aristotlee fix it. Finally, the well-brought-up become fully virtuous by being taught why virtuous acts are virtuous. Aristotle is giving us paradigms, not pigeon holes. Presumably, the continent make moral progress by similarly acquiring habits of virtuous passion. The learner enjoys the virtuous act, “because it is what is truly or by nature pleasant.
So the continent are counter-examples to Kosman’s suggestion that right action instills right passions. University of Notre Dame Press, ], p.
But how can the performing of virtuous acts provide knowledge of which acts are virtuous, induce people to choose virtuous acts for their own sake or inculcate habits of virtuous passion? Now the generous-minded are ldarning lovers of what is noble,” so they choose virtuous acts for their own sake. Aristotle says that we learn which acts are virtuous, choose virtuous acts for their own sake, and acquire virtuous habits by performing virtuous acts.
Mixed Results for Virtue Ethics. Fourth, they gain habits of virtuous passions by regretting their vicious passions and become well-brought-up. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks this works successfully because virtuous acts are pleasant. The many, on the other hand, are not incurably bad. Fifth, Burnyeat’s explanation of how virtuous action provides the ability to choose to perform virtuous acts for their own sake fails because Aristotle is committed the view that learners do not typically enjoy virtuous afistotle.
Myles F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on learning to be good – PhilPapers
Burnyeat says, “I may be told, and may believe, that such and such actions are just and noble, but I have not really learned for myself taken larning heart, made second nature to me that they have this intrinsic value until I have learned to value love them for it. Of course, a firm character includes not only habits of virtuous action, but also habits of virtuous passion. Marta Jimenez – – Phronesis 61 1: If virtuous activities are like games, then practice makes virtuous acts pleasant, too.
Food incontinent also make moral progress motivated by pain, the pain of regretting vicious acts. There is no reason to learniing that we acquire these characteristics in the same way at the same time. The ability to perform virtuous acts does not, by itself, make these acts pleasant.
Aristotle on learning to be good
So the incontinent are counter-examples to Burnyeat’s thesis that learners come to choose virtuous acts for their own sake by performing virtuous acts. Forged from a partnership between a university press and a library, Project MUSE is a trusted part of the academic and scholarly community it serves.
However, the analogy fails. They have the same traits as those among the many who make moral progress. Book titles OR Journal titles. So how do we procure knowledge of which acts are virtuous, come to chose to perform virtuous acts for their own sake, and acquire habitual virtuous passions?
Learners will not find all or even most virtuous acts to be pleasant because virtuous acts are not typically pleasant even for the virtuouslet alone for the learners. Once the generous-minded have learned which acts are virtuous, they have progressed to incontinence.
Instead, “the many think [happiness] is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure, wealth, or birnyeat a Making virtuous acts pleasant requires something over and above the skills provided by practice. Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle. Virtuous action does not bring learners to choose virtuous acts for their own sake.
However, virtuous acts are not like games in the crucial respect.
I have argued that virtuous acts are not typically pleasant, even for the virtuous, let alone for learners on the path to virtue. Richardson – – Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 3: Eating the right amount is not pleasant for people whose appetites are too large or too small. Nate Charlow – – Synthese Rent from DeepDyve Recommend.
Desire and the Good in Plotinus.